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vTRANSITIONING SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY INTO 
ACQUISITION PROGRAMS: ASSESSING ONE GOVERNMENT 
LABORATORY’S PROCESSES 
ABSTRACT 
This paper examined the strengths and weaknesses of the overall technology 
transition process between Armament Research, Development and Engineering Center 
(ARDEC) and its partnered program offices in transitioning technology into established 
Programs of Record. This examination was a direct review and comparison of Department 
of Defense policies, U.S. Government Accountability Office reports 
and recommendations, and ARDEC and the program managers established processes.  
The research indicated that the following recommendations should be implemented 
by other research and development (R&D) organizations to foster proper technology 
transition: endorsement from future customers, collaboration early on with the soldier and 
developing organizations, alignment with soldier needs, lever available capabilities, and 
introduction of technology transition agreements. 
Research also indicated that in order for ARDEC to continue to improve its 
technology transition process, it should focus on the transition and inclusion of industry, 
address all changes and decisions, and conduct affordability and tradeoff analysis. 
Additionally, ARDEC should fill all management positions with qualified individuals, 
assign managers for durations of program, stress importance of operations deployment, and 
use service acquisition organizations to review the process and R&D adaptability to PM 
expectations. 
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Over the past several years, many groups have tried to study the Science and 
Technology “Valley of Death”: the transition of technology from a research and 
development organization to a program manager. Some of these organizations include the 
Defense Acquisition University (DAU), the U.S. Government Accountability Office 
(GAO), the U.S. Armament, Research, Development and Engineering Center (ARDEC) 
and the Program Executive Office for Ammunition (PEO Ammo). 
The FY 2006 Defense Authorization Act directed the DOD to “assess 
organizational barriers, acquisition regulations, requirements validation, and the planning, 
programming, budgeting, and execution processes impacting the ability to transition the 
technology from science and technology (S&T) into acquisition” programs (Harger & 
Kubricky, 2007, pp. 1–3). As requested by Section 255 of the FY 2006 Act, in 2007 the 
Department of Defense (DOD) reported to Congress on the Technology Transition 
challenges and identified several barriers.  
As briefly noted above, transitioning technology into established Programs of 
Record (PoR) has been a longstanding defense challenge. In 1999, the adoption of 
Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs) may have introduced unintended consequences 
impeding the transition process. The TRL scale measured the “maturity of an individual 
technology, with a view toward operational use in a system context. A more comprehensive 
set of concerns became relevant when this metric is abstracted from an individual 
technology to a system context, which involved interplay between multiple technologies” 
(Ramirez-Marques & Sauser, 2009, p. 533). Traditionally, S&T communities advance 
programs to a TRL 5 level of maturity or even TRL 6 level, and then move on to the next 
program. Acquisition communities, on the other hand, require a higher level of maturity 
for consideration as a PoR, specifically, TRL 7 level, to help reduce risk. Harger and 
Kubricky (2007) determined that there might be “disconnects between the S&T and 
acquisition communities” (p. 1). Therefore, although meant to create a common 
understanding of technology readiness terminology, the TRL system created a gap. This 
technology/maturity gap, although seemingly small, is commonly referred to as the “Valley 
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of Death.” The S&T community’s efforts could be for naught; many of their researched 
technologies, although they work and provide a solution, seem rarely to become PoRs.     
As a leading U.S. Army Center for Research and Development (R&D) work, the 
Armament Research, Development and Engineering Center (ARDEC) is continuously 
trying to improve the overall process of transitioning technology. This research will 
examine the strengths and weaknesses of that overall technology transition process in the 
following primary areas: inter-organizational barriers between ARDEC and its customers, 
acquisition regulations, requirements validation, and the planning, programming, 
budgeting, and execution process. We analyze the overall problems in the various reports, 
the description of what ARDEC has done to address these issues, and the complementary 
processes that PEO Ammo has implemented.  We can use these examples to help other 
organizations utilize the best practices that ARDEC and PEO Ammo currently use.  We 
also identify areas where they are still working to improve, which will add further examples 
for organizations to achieve better technology transition. 
Through the exploration of these topics, we make some recommendations that 
organizations should consider incorporating into their S&T Process to improve the 
transition of technology to PEO and PM customers. 
First, an endorsement from the current and future customers is critical to the 
identification of interest in technology and where it should be inserted. This endorsement 
should include the type of technology, the specific transition time frame, and how it will 
fit within the overall program framework. Many PEOs and PMOs have begun developing 
roadmaps for their specific commodities to plan technology insertion points, quantify the 
number of spare parts for the lifetime of a system, and to identify a system’s useful life 
requirements before it is planned to be replaced with an upgraded or new system/solution. 
Second, to assist in the development of requirements up-front and early 
collaboration with the Soldier community and the respective CoE is essential. Without 
requirements, completed S&T projects have few avenues for proceeding as PoRs. Aside 
from participating in demonstrations to gain interest from SOCOM, Rapid Equipment 
Force (REF) or another organization with the ability to purchase systems independent of 
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the normal Acquisition Life Cycle Process, there needs to be a requirement in order for 
S&T efforts to become PoRs. Collaboration will help  make the CoE aware of the 
capabilities of S&T and make the CoE aware of the current technologies that are available 
or already being developed. 
Third, alignment with currently identified Soldier needs and existing/staffed 
requirements documents is needed. Similar to the previous collaboration, this is a document 
review and match between existing identified gap areas from the Soldier community, such 
as War Fighter Outcomes (WFOs) and the prioritized gap areas from each CoE. Analyzing 
the WFOs and current requirements documents and then aligning   S&T Portfolio with  
these documents can be very helpful in transitioning to a PoR. Having requirement 
documents already completed is a huge advantage in this matter. However, even without a 
requirements document, it is important to at least be aligned with existing documentation 
of gap areas in order to justify the work that you do, while you can work with the CoE in 
order to develop a requirements document for transition when the effort is complete. 
Fourth, up-front and early collaboration and communication between developing 
organizations is essential. Most projects require inter-operability and different 
development agencies to work in harmony in order to accomplish the successful, timely, 
and technical completion of a project. For example, the identified weapons experts must 
work with the platform experts and the communications experts. Without this 
collaboration, integration, functionality and logistics support technology transition would  
at a very high risk and could easily lead to the transition failing or being delayed. Working 
together and defining interfaces and controls for those interfaces is paramount to having 
the systems work together as they need to in today’s System-of-Systems reality of the 
battlefield. 
Fifth, having the ability to successfully leverage capabilities available to provide 
the best possible solution to the War Fighter is imperative. This includes being aware of 
and collaborating with academia, industry and foreign agencies. There are many ways to 
perform this collaboration; through attendance at conferences, industry research and 
development reviews, technical information exchanges, foreign technology information 
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papers, and even Internet searches. All of these help us to leverage as much technological 
knowledge as possible when developing the solutions to War Fighter needs that can be 
transitioned to PoRs and ultimately the Soldiers themselves. 
Finally, TTAs need to be in place and have explicit criteria for both the developing 
agency and the future customers. The two major issues with this currently are that the 
deliverables of the S&T efforts are not clearly defined and that the future customers make 
no commitments to use the developed technologies. This is why having a defined 
requirement is so important. Without a requirements document of some kind, it is difficult 
for a customer to transition the technology to a PoR. Additionally, regular status reviews 
between the PM and ARDEC are very important in assuring continued commitment, 
alignment and execution of the technology for transition. 
The below are recommendations that ARDEC should continue to pursue or should 
incorporate into their S&T Process to improve the transition of technology to PEO and PM 
customers: 
1. Focus on the transition, and identify and track meaningful metrics 
associated with technology transition. The kind of metrics to be used are 
situational dependent; however, the metrics should be agreed to up-front 
by all stakeholders and reviewed regularly. 
2. Include industry in a systematic and routine way as part of the process, so 
that it is beneficial to both the industry and government sectors. 
3. Address all “–ilities” in a meaningful way,  rather than merely assuring 
membership on the S&T project IPTs. This means being able to identify 
design and functionality changes and decisions that were influenced by 
these design considerations. 
4. Conduct affordability and cost tradeoffs by updating the cost data as the 
technology matures and as relevant manufacturing and support costs 
become more evident. 
5. Fill all key project management positions with qualified people. 
Individuals with  technology transition experience would be the best 
choice. 
6. Assure that program managers and transition managers  remain assigned 
for the duration of the associated project(s). 
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7. Favor operational development over formal demonstrations. 
8. Use service acquisition organizations to periodically evaluate and advise 
the project team. 
9. Adapt the R&D project deliverables or tradeoffs in cost, schedule, 
performance and risk based upon the expectations of the PM transition 
partner. 
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A. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the historical background of the problems inherent to 
technology transition in the DOD and will provide scope for the subsequent chapters.  It 
describes the purpose and background of technology transition, listing identified problems 
and how the rest of this paper addresses these problems through the analysis of the case of 
the Armament Research Development Engineering Center (ARDEC) and the Program 
Executive Office for Ammunition (PEO-AMMO).  
B. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
According to Section 255 of the Defense Authorization Act of 2006, transitioning 
technology into established Programs of Record (PoR) has been a longstanding Department 
of Defense (DOD) challenge. Technology transition has been a hot major challenge for the 
government over the last several years. As stated in “Accelerating Technology Transition: 
Bridging the Valley of Death for Materials and Processes in Defense Systems,” the 
Department of Defense is changing course and transitioning from a Cold War-era fighting 
force to a more efficient technology driven group.  Historical instances of technology 
transition have been neither fast nor efficient. The usual interval of time requisite for a 
technology to transition is at least 10 years. Therefore accelerating technology transition of 
new ideas into actual defense systems is fundamental in accomplishing this change 
(Committee on Accelerating Technology Transition, 2004, p. 1). 
This research explored both the shortcomings and processes implemented to 
resolve those issues of transitioning Science & Technology (S&T) community’s 
technology into PoRs. This exploration was accomplished through the examination of 
communication, organizational structure and processes used between U.S. Armament, 
Research, Development and Engineering Center (ARDEC) and their largest customer, the 
Program Executive Office for Ammunition (PEO Ammo). Through highlighting the 
relationship between ARDEC and the PEO Ammo, we found strengths and weaknesses. 
By evaluating ARDEC’s strategy for improving the transition of S&T technology, we 
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found best practices and shortfalls. Through this study, we provided recommendations for 
what ARDEC should be doing and should not be doing. 
C. BACKGROUND 
In order to understand the current issues with transition, we needed first to 
understand some of the history of technology transition within the DOD.  This section gives 
some of the structure of the organizations reviewed in this paper, as well as some of the history 
of technology transition within the DOD.  The following highlight the reliance of the DOD on 
its research and development organizations. DOD is highly dependent on “its research 
laboratories, test facilities, industry and academia” to evolve and improve highly advanced new 
technologies (Government Accountability Office [GAO], 2005, p. 4).  The report further states 
that, historically these facilities have experienced difficulties transitioning these new 
technologies to the acquisition community, which controls the bulk of the DOD’s R&D 
funding. As illustrated by Figure 1, this transitioning difficulty is due to the acquisition 
programs’ reluctance to finance the technology through its final technology readiness stages 
into integration (Government Accountability Office [GAO], 2005, p. 4). 
Figure 1.  Avoiding the Valley of Death 
 
Source: R. Lightsey. (n.d.). Transition techniques (avoiding the “Valley of Death”), 
[PowerPoint slides]. Retrieved from Defense Acquisition University: 
https://acc.dau.mil/search?id=1&q=Robert+Lightsey&lang=en-US 
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Technology transition is defined as  
the use of technology in military systems to create effective weapons and 
support systems in the quantity and quality needed by the warfighter to carry 
out assigned missions at the ’best value’ as measured by the warfighter. Best 
value refers to increased performance as well as reduced cost for 
developing, producing, acquiring, and operating systems throughout their 
life cycle. (Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy [DPAP] Office of 
the Under Secretary of Defense, 2003, p. 1–1) 
The senior executives at the Department of Defense recognize many of the 
challenges associated with transitioning technology from S&T into acquisition programs. 
One of the intentions of technology transition is to achieve the Soldier’s needs at the 
minimum Total Ownership Cost (TOC). As a result, technology transition’s objectives are 
to utilize resources that are readily available. This is done by leveraging the best 
commercial and non-commercial technology, expeditiously transitioning novel technology 
into new or existing systems, incremental improvements to existing technologies to help 
maintain overmatch and safeguarding any new cutting-edge research and technology to 
prevent disclosure of any kind (DPAP Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, 2003, p. 
1–2). 
As with all organizations within the Research Development Engineering Command 
(RDECOM), as illustrated in Figure 2, ARDEC strives to transition technology at as high 
a rate as possible. RDECOM tracks this as part of an annual data call referred to as the 
Technology Characterization Index (TCI). Due to locality, ARDEC began to explore how 
to improve the transition process with the resident customer at Picatinny: PEO Ammo. The 
two organizations worked together with mutual interest to develop processes and 
procedures that benefitted both organizations, and by extension, the warfighter. As a result 
of this collaborative nature, ARDEC was able to better quantify and qualify how the two 
organizations’ portfolios were aligned. In November 2007, ARDEC “became the first 
Department of Defense (DOD) organization in history selected to receive the prestigious 
Malcolm Baldrige National Quality Award,” which according to the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST) “is the nation’s highest presidential honor for quality 
and organizational performance excellence” (Bush, 2007; Kosko, 2005). Part of its award 
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recognition was its focus on technology transition. Baldrige performance excellence is 
defined as follows:  
the framework and an assessment tool for understanding organizational 
strengths and opportunities for improvement. Performance excellence refers 
to an integrated approach to organization performance management that 
results in delivery of ever-improving value to customers and stakeholders, 
contributing to organizational sustainability, improvement of overall 
organizational effectiveness and capabilities and organizational and 
personal learning (“What is Performance Excellence?”, 2010).  
In the same timeframe, the Army Audit Agency (AAA) also designated ARDEC as 
the Army’s benchmark for technology transition, further emphasizing that ARDEC 
recognized the importance of technology transition. This by no means indicated that 
ARDEC had all of the answers. Instead, it signified the center had certain activities in place 
to assist in the transition process that have worked and have served as examples for other 
DOD organizations. We explored some of these processes, organizational structures and 
communication methods that were used to achieve the improvements in technology 
transition as well as those areas that still need  improvement. 
Figure 2.  RDECOM Organization Chart  
 
Source: Army Technology.  (n.d.). Greater than the sum of its Parts [Chart]. Retrieved 




D. PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION 
Although recognized for its technology transition processes, transitioning 
technology into established Programs of Record (PoR) has been a historical challenge for 
ARDEC. The ARDEC Portfolio Review Analysis and the RDECOM Technology 
Characterization Index (TCI) perform reviews and analyses of the successful transition rate 
for ARDEC S&T projects.  Both the ARDEC Portfolio Analysis and the TCI are performed 
annually to gauge the rate of transition within the organization. This study analyzed how 
the structure and process of inter-organizational technology transition may be generating 
impediments, specifically ARDEC’s strategy for improving the technology transition rate. 
It also explores the improvements that both ARDEC and its major customer, Program 
Executive Officer – Ammunition (PEO Ammo), have made to their processes in order to 
address this low rate of transition. 
E. RESEARCH QUESTION 
This project addresses one primary and two subsidiary research questions: 
1. Primary Question 
 What are the strengths and weaknesses of the overall processes whereby the 
ARDEC Headquarters transitions S&T into Acquisition Programs of 
Record? 
2. Secondary Questions 
 How can the communication structure and process between ARDEC and 
the S&T community be described (i.e., extent of effectiveness of inter-
organizational communications and external stakeholder management). 
 What is the relationship structure between ARDEC and relevant Program 
Managers (PM); and ARDEC and PEO Ammo concerning the transition of 
S&T technology into ARDEC, and how is that relationship changing?   
F. BENEFITS AND LIMITATIONS 
Benefits of this study included the following:   
 Objectively assessing ARDEC’s strengths and pitfalls in technology 
transition,  
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 Identifying improvements, that ARDEC may have implemented and that 
can be utilized by other organizations.  
 Identifying of best practices utilized by ARDEC and PEO Ammo that can 
be utilized by other organizations to improve their own technology 
transition processes.  
 Drawing conclusions on best practices and in-process work that both 
ARDEC and PEO Ammo exemplified that can be leveraged by other 
organizations in their own technology transition.  
The limitations to this study were the changing and evolving processes that were 
being identified, explored and evaluated. Other limitations were access to sensitive 
information pertaining to certain technologies and/or Programs of Record. 
G. SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDY 
The technology/maturity gap, also known as the “Valley of Death,” as illustrated 
in Figure 3, is a problem with which ARDEC is all too familiar. Headquartered at Picatinny 
Arsenal, NJ, ARDEC is a leading center for Research and Development work. ARDEC is 
continuously trying to improve the overall process of transitioning technology. This 
research examines the strengths and weaknesses of that overall technology transition 
process in the following primary areas:  ARDEC organizational barriers, acquisition 




Figure 3.  The “Valley of Death”: the Divide between the S&T and Program 
Management  
 
Source: Hagan, G. (2011). Transition of Technology into the DoD Acquisition Process 




This study was dependent on literature reviews that stem from internal documents 
from ARDEC, Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports, Defense Acquisition 
University courses and other scholarly articles focused on technology transition. The 
analysis methodology focused on the information in these documents to provide a better 
understanding of what the issues truly were, and what ARDEC and PEO Ammo have done 
to address those issues. We then compared and contrasted these documents to identify both 
similarities that showed consistency of the issues, as well as the trial-and-error state of the 
solution sets to this technology transition issue. This study reviewed the structure and 
processes used by ARDEC to improve technology transition. 
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I. OVERVIEW 
This chapter began with a background of the problems inherent to technology 
transition in the DOD and provided a framework for the subsequent chapters. This chapter 
also discussed the purpose and background of technology transition. There is a list of 
problems that have been identified. The rest of this paper addresses these problems through 
the analysis of the case of the Armament Research Development Engineering Center 
(ARDEC) and the Program Executive Office for Ammunition (PEO-AMMO). The chapter 
concluded with an overview and methodology that was used for the research project. The 
next chapter of this project will identify the literature reviewed for the analysis and research 
on technology transition for the DOD, ARDEC and PEO Ammo. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
This chapter identifies the literature reviewed for the analysis and research on 
technology transition for the DOD, ARDEC and PEO Ammo. It specifically addresses the 
legislation and policy enacted by Congress with regard to technology transfer, including 
the Defense Authorization Act of 2006. This chapter discusses DOD’s response to the 
mandates in this Act. We discuss investigations and reports completed by GAO regarding 
technology transfer. This will help to frame the discussion on technology transfer for our 
benchmark organizations: ARDEC and PEO Ammo. 
B. CONGRESS INITIATIVE 
Technology transition is an area of concern for the legislative branch, “since 1980, 
Congress has enacted a series of laws to promote technology transition and to provide 
technology transition mechanisms” (Federal Laboratory Consortium for Technology 
Transfer, 2013, p. x).  The Federal Laboratory Consortium for Technology Transfer goes 
on to state that “although federal technology transition policy is established by legislation 
and executive orders… each federal department and agency” establishes the definite and 
comprehensive approach and practices “that guide how technology transfer is to be 
conducted within its own organization” (p. viii). Two relevant pieces of legislation deserve 
special attention. 
1. National Defense Authorization Act of FY 2003 
This act established the Technology Transition Initiative (TTI), a DOD program 
which helped advance technology from an S&T program into a DOD acquisition program. 
As was stated in Title 10 Armed Forces 2359a Technology Transition Initiative, “Congress 
established the TTI, in 2002, to bridge the gap between demonstration and production of 
S&T funded technology” (“Technology Transition Initiative,” n.d., 
 para. 1). This act recognized that often it “takes 2–3 years to obtain procurement funding 
to buy a product, and during that time, many technology projects either become obsolete 
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or are cancelled due to a lack of funding” - the TTI was meant to help to prevent this (para. 
1). 
2. National Defense Authorization Act of FY 2006  
A portion of the Defense Authorization Act of FY 2006, section 255 titled 
Technology Transition, established a requirement for the DOD to file a report concerning 
the challenges linked with technology transition. In the purpose section of the report, it 
stated that the focus of the report was to find any barriers within the DOD, an assessment 
of the effects of Department regulations, an assessment of the effects of the requirements 
validation process and any other challenges found by the Secretary. Below is the 
Department of Defense response (National Defense Authorization Act, 2006, pp. 3180–
3181). 
C. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RESPONSE 
As stated above, the DOD’s formal response is described below.  It highlighted the 
findings of attributes of a successful technology transition program and some courses of 
action that the DOD planned to take in order to improve technology transition. 
1. Department of Defense Report to Congress on Technology Transition 
The purpose of the July 2007 DOD report was to “examine the principal barriers 
that impede technology transition and outline a plan to address the root causes of those 
barriers” (Harger & Kubricky, 2007, Foreword). As stated in Table 1, the DOD report to 
Congress found that there were improvements in the way S&T was transitioned; however, 
it also found that there was a significant opportunity for improvement and addressed 
challenges that needed to be overcome. Table 1 lists many of the same obstacles found in 





Table 1.   Excerpt of S&T Affordability Workshop, Transition Panel, June 
10–11, 1997  
 
Source: Harger, K.L. & Kubricky, J. J. (2007). Department of defense report to congress 
on technology transition. Washington, DC: The Office of Department of the 
Undersecretary of Defense. Retrieved from https://acc.dau.mil/adl/en-
US/173369/file/31016/Tech%20Transition%20Report%20to%20Congress%20-%20Aug
ust%202007.pdf.  
However, according to the DOD report to Congress, there were some improvements 
made toward successful technology transition such as the military departments’ and 
defense agencies’ leadership accepted that early technology transition planning and 
achievement were necessary to succeed in the future.  Leadership rolled out experimental 
trial programs to exhibit methods for transitioning technology. Additionally, in order to 
obtain a more agile transition force, the military departments worked on restructuring the 
Technology Transition Council (TTC), which was comprised of senior leadership from 
Combatant Commands, military defense agencies, the acquisition and S&T communities. 
As a result of the aforementioned, the Department’s Chief Technology Officer (CTO) 
assigned an Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Innovation and Technology 
Transition (ADUSD [I&TT]) to focus on successful technology transition (Harger & 
Kubricky, 2007, pp. 4–5). Table 2 lists some of the initiatives or approaches taken by the 
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different branches of DOD to try to help breach the technology transition gap from the 
R&D phase to a PoR.  






Source: Harger, K.L. & Kubricky, J. J. (2007). Department of defense report to congress 
on technology transition. Washington, DC: The Office of Department of the 
Undersecretary of Defense. Retrieved from https://acc.dau.mil/adl/en-
US/173369/file/31016/Tech%20Transition%20Report%20to%20Congress%20-%20Aug
ust%202007.pdf.  
The report concluded that there was a disconnect between the TRL of the S&T 
community’s goals and the acquisition policy.  Acquisition policy required a minimum of 
a TRL 7 maturity for use in a POR, and the S&T community only matured technology to 
a TRL 5 in preparation of that transition. This was a significant gap between the needs of 
both communities (creation and integration of new technologies) (Harger & Kubricky, 
2007, pp. 1–16). The report stated the following Technology Transition could be attained 
through a collaborative effort of the acquisition and S&T community. This up-front, early 
and frequent communication was key to assuring that the S&T and acquisition 
communities were aligned.  By ascribing a commitment of resources, leadership 
experiences and administering a strong management relationship, the warfighter would 
receive its necessary capabilities (pp. 14–15). 
2. Acquisition, Technology and Logistics 
As Dobbins described in Planning for Technology Transition, acquisition programs 
require more oversight: Good transition planning was essential because technologies that 
were ready to be transitioned were not usually a component of the program objectives 
memorandum (POM) for a specific acquisition program. As a result, that lack of oversight 
or documentation placed these new technologies at risk of missing an opportunity for a 
successful transition (Dobbins, 2004, p. 14).  
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The article stated that acquisition programs required more oversight than what was 
required for initial technology development; therefore technology transition will require 
the same planning as that required by acquisition programs. The article further stated that 
a high enough TRL level in the new technology was essential for the integration into the 
acquisition program with minimal risk. This point was further illustrated in a memorandum 
released by the Undersecretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Ashton 
B. Carter, “the process for conducting technology readyness assessments (TRAs) has 
strayed from its original intent and should be reformed. TRAs should focus only on 
technology maturity, as opposed to engineering and integration risk and the responsibility 
for ensuring that technology maturity risk is adequately identified and mitigated should 
rest with the Program Manager (PM), Program Executive Officer and Component 
Acquisition Executive, subject to ASD(R&E) review” (Carter, 2011, p. 1). As illustrated 
by Figure 4, the acquisition life cycle looks straight forward, however, as previously stated, 
a high enough TRL is needed to ease the technology transition into the next stage with 
minimal risk. 
Figure 4.  DOD Acquisition Life Cycle 
 
Source: Department of Defense. (2015, January 7). Operation of the defense acquisition 





Dobbins (2004) stated that the following factors were imperative to have a 
successful technology transfer: transition strategy, transition plan, requirements 
development, transition integrated product team, overarching IPT, understanding the 
technology readiness level, acquisition funding, contracting strategy, transition milestone 
events, critical elements of the management plan, military user test and evaluation, military 
user assessment, defense acquisition executive review, and metrics.  Dobbins summed this 
up “in summary, we can say that good transition planning requires involvement and 
coordination among several people, establishment of IPTs, and the use of proper metrics; 
and while not always easy, it is critical to the success of technology transition” (p. 17). 
Additionally, on a basic level, program management (PM) organizations were 
focused on balancing risk with reward to deliver products to the war fighter. Figure 5 
demonstrates the fundamental relationship between risk and reward from a PM perspective. 
This helped us to understand how the S&T community needs to consider these factors when 
planning to transition. 
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Figure 5.  Different Views of Reward Structure for New Technologies – Data 
Rights for Science and Technology Projects 
 
Source: Arndt, C. & Muzzelo, L. (2014). Data rights for science and technology projects. 
Huntsville, AL: Defense Acquisition University. Retrieved from 
http://dau.dodlive.mil/files/2014/11/ARJ69_Muzzelo.pdf. 
D. GAO REPORTS 
In the report titled Best Practices Better Management of Technology Development 
Can Improve Weapon System Outcomes, GAO assessed the following: “(1) the impact of 
technology maturity on product outcomes, (2) best practices for managing new 
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technologies and incorporating them into products, and (3) ways DOD can adapt these 
practices to get better outcomes on weapon system programs” (1999, p. 2). This report 
determined that the incorporation of immature technologies into leading edge capabilities 
was a major “source of cost increases, schedule delays, and performance problems on 
weapon systems” (p. 69). Furthermore, evidence showed that leading commercial firms 
achieve higher quality products within smaller timeframes and budgets. These firms have 
managed to achieve these results by separating the development of the product and 
advanced technologies. This has allowed the product managers to put their whole energy 
into the production of the product and the increased ability to deliver a successful end item. 
If DOD were to adapt these techniques, it would reduce costs and decrease the time 
between transition and production, thereby allowing DOD to insert new technologies more 
rapidly into its programs.  The report stated that the successful programs that were reviewed 
within DOD had S&T organizations or a team of S&T and product developers that 
managed and developed the technology until it was ready to be inserted into the program. 
In addition, the report also noted that these S&T organizations/managers had the 
knowledge, expertise, resources, processes, information flexibility and authority required 
to mature the technology to the point where it could be transitioned into a program (pp. 
61–62). 
The report stated that GAO had formerly suggested that technology development 
be separated from weapon system programs. The current report again recommended 
separation of technology development and weapon system programs. Moreover, GAO 
advised the Secretary of Defense to embrace DOD wide knowledge-based methods such 
as TRLs to evaluate technology maturity. GAO stated that DOD needed to match the key 
technology and systems requirements.  In addition, DOD should provide the community 
with the appropriate resources and provide a commitment to a cost, schedule and 
performance baseline for the system. Lastly, the report recommended that analogous 
technology insertion points to those used by the commercial community such as TRL 7 be 
used to facilitate the insertion of new technologies into existing programs (GAO, 1999, p. 
64).  
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In addition, the report recommended that the Secretary discover further approaches 
to allow the managers of weapon systems and new technologies more flexibility in finding 
ways of developing and acquiring new knowledge distinct from the delivery of a final 
product. Finally, the report also recommended S&T organizations be granted the ability to 
play a greater role in developing new technologies to higher technology readiness levels 
(GAO, 1999, p. 64). 
In a different report, also authored by GAO and titled Best Practices Stronger 
Practices Needed to Improve DOD Technology Transition Process, it was determined that 
again, DOD needed more mature technologies before transitioning them to the product 
line. During this study, GAO determined that industry utilized Strategic Planning at the 
corporate level, gated management reviews and corroborating tools for all of its successful 
technology transitions. Although DOD utilized some of these same tools, it was still 
lacking. According to the report, “development of DOD’s new weapon systems depends 
on two distinct phases: technology development and product development” (GAO, 2006, 
p. 6). The GAO report recommended the following actions to improve technology 
transition throughout DOD: a gated process for developing and transitioning technologies 
and specific criteria to support continued funding. The report also recommended increased 
use of technology transition agreements (TTAs), relationship managers, metrics to 
demonstrate the readiness and risks of including the technology, and utilization of process-
oriented metrics to assess the status and measure the improvement in transition (pp. 40–
41). 
Out of all of the recommendations above, DOD only concurred with two of the 
recommendations: establish gated reviews and increase the utilization of technology 
transition agreements (TTAs). Furthermore, DOD only partially agreed with the 
recommendations to incorporate further metrics in TTAs and expand the utilization of 
relationship managers. Moreover, DOD did not agree with the recommendations to develop 
additional process-oriented metrics or to allocate a section of advanced technology 
development for the S&T community (GAO, 2006, pp 50–53). 
In 2007, the Director, Acquisition & Sourcing Management U.S. Government 
Accountability Office, Michael J. Sullivan presented Review of Technology Transition 
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Practices. In this presentation, GAO reiterated the key enablers for industry were as 
follows: First, robust strategic planning to prioritize technology needs and react to the 
market needs. Second, structured technology and development processes, utilization of 
TTAs, relationship managers and metrics. In addition, GAO also recommended a transition 
phase that combined technology development and product development, with the funding 
responsibility to gradually shift from the labs to the program during the last phase of the 
transfer (GAO, 2007, pp. 8–13). 
GAO again released another report in March 2013, titled Defense Technology 
Development, Technology Transition Programs Support Military Users, but Opportunities 
Exist to Improve Measurement of Outcomes. This report brought to light that, although 
technology transitioning within DOD had improved, there were many improvements that 
still needed to be incorporated. Overall, the report found that transition managers did not 
track projects beyond their transition, thereby limiting management’s capacity “to know 
and report final outcomes for transitioned technologies and the associated benefits realized 
from those technologies” (GAO, 2013, Highlights). According to the GAO report, the 
DOD departments’ technology transition programs that were implemented did not follow 
all of the associated management processes and tools outlined in previous GAO reports. 
As a result, this led to issues and the inability to directly address the problems that arose. 
Of the more successful technology transition programs reviewed by GAO, the program 
officials stated that regular communication with the stakeholders was paramount to ensure 
a successful technology transition outcome. Additionally, many of those same officials also 
stated that tools such as TTAs were crucial in holding stakeholders accountable in 
facilitating successful technology transitions. The purpose of this GAO report was “to (1) 
determine what DOD programs exist that are dedicated to facilitating technology transition 
from the S&T base to military users, (2) assess the outcomes for these transition programs, 
and (3) identify practices among the programs that may facilitate technology transition” 
(GAO, 2013, p. 1). However, for the purposes of this JAP, we concentrated on what 
practices among the reviewed programs were identified that could facilitate technology 
transition. We took the positive outcomes on program structure, processes, transitioning 
tools and metrics used to keep track of transition outcomes for the 20 technology transitions 
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reviewed within the GAO report and compared them to ARDEC’s current processes and 
procedures. The report found that there were many tools used to aid communication 
between all the stakeholders. Of the 20 transition programs reviewed, it was found that 
nine used TTAs. Additionally, the report found that the TTAs at a minimum outlined 
“operation need, proposed technical solution, transition target information, transition 
requirements, integration strategy, business case, risk, cost and schedule, and project points 
of contact” (GAO, 2013, pp. 23–27). In addition, GAO determined that the Joint Capability 
Technology and Future Naval Capabilities programs used Transition Commitment Level 
(TCL) tools, such as the one illustrated in Figure 6, which provided an additional way to 
verify that possible system users were also highly invested in the transition of the projects 
(GAO, 2013, pp. 23–27).  
Figure 6.  Example of Transition Commitment Level Project Evaluation Tool 
 
Source: Government Accountability Office (GAO) (2013). Defense technology 
development: technology transition programs support military users, but opportunities 
exist to improve measurement of outcomes (GAO-13-286). Washington, DC: Author. 
Retrieved from http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-286. 
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The GAO concluded that, the technology transition programs it reviewed were 
reasonably successful in providing the user with the required and needed technologies. 
However, there were a limited number of programs that did not have established metrics 
to keep track of the transitioned programs or measure the benefits of the transitioned 
technologies into those programs. This lack of insight resulted in an inability to know if 
the technologies transitioned were the right technologies for the right users (GAO, 2013, 
p. 29). As a result, the GAO report recommended that all technology transition programs 
review and measure the outcome of the project. This included any long-term impacts such 
as benefits and disadvantages experienced by the program and the users in the field. In 
addition, the report also recommended that transition programs be assed in order to increase 
the use of TTAs, technology commitment level evaluation mechanisms or other transition 
management tools (GAO, 2013, p. 30).   
E. ARDEC AND PEO AMMO DOCUMENTATION 
In their efforts to better transition technology from their S&T portfolio to the PM 
community, ARDEC has developed processes and documentation to meet those needs. 
Figure 7 depicts the over-arching process map that ARDEC used to execute and transition 











Figure 7.  Office of the Director of Technology (ODoT) S&T Investment 
Strategy Process 
 
Source: Pelino, J. (n.d.). S&T Investment Process. [Power Point slide]. Presented to the 
Office of the Director of Technology (ODoT). Picatinny Arsenal, NJ.   
As you can see, it included alignment with the stakeholders including the 
requirements community in TRADOC and the PM customers throughout. Another key 
document was the Technology Transition Agreement (TTA) Template that ARDEC has 
developed with help from their resident (at Picatinny, NJ) customer, PEO Ammo.  
Summarized below are the sections within the TTA, a copy of the actual template is 
available in Appendix A. 
The TTA Template that ARDEC uses with PEO Ammo includes the following 
sections:  
1. An introduction, with identification of the purpose, scope, background and 
key stakeholders. 
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2. A basic transition agreement, with a description of the technology for 
transition, the acquisition strategy for the gaining PoR and the integration 
strategy for the technology. 
3. Technical details and programmatics, including the current status of the 
technology, key metrics and the funding adequacy. 
4. Effective date, review and termination, which has the terms agreed to and 
concludes with the signatures of the relevant stakeholders. 
The TTA Template included major aspects of the DOD Guidance such as; detailed 
descriptions of the deliverables from the S&T community and the risks that the S&T 
community will be mitigating and reporting during the transition. Additionally, the TTA 
includes the program plan that the S&T effort maps into  the PM as well as signature blocks 
for all of the relevant Stakeholders in the technology transition process. The ARDEC 
Director of Technology identified the need to communicate routinely with Stakeholders 
across the DOD, taking input on priorities from the PEOs and TRADOC, and aligning to 
DOD initiatives, such as Better Buying Power 3.0 (see Figure 8). In Figure 8 below, 
ARDEC’s alignment was seen through the portfolio of projects to both their PM and 
TRADOC customers through the lens of the DOD’s Better Buying Power 3.0 initiative 
(Figure 8).  
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Figure 8.  Aligned to Better Buying Power 3.0 
 
Source: Pelino, J. (2015, April 22). Retaining Lethality Overmatch through Science & 
Technology. [Power Point slide] Presented at National Defense Industrial Association 
(NDIA). Picatinny Arsenal, NJ. 
This chapter helped to illustrate the issues that DOD organizations had historically 
been faced with regarding technology transition. It also gave us some insight into 
recommended courses of action that an organization could take in order to address these 
issues and improve their technology transition to their customer organizations and 
ultimately the warfighter. It also showed the documentation that ARDEC and PEO Ammo 
had created in order to align with each other to achieve these technology transition goals. 
In the next section, we will compare and contrast how ARDEC implemented processes, 
organizational structure and communication methods in order to improve their own 
technology transition. We also explored where some holes may exist that can be addressed 
in the future. 
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III. ARDEC ANALYSIS 
A. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
We have seen what the S&T Affordability Workshop, the DOD, and GAO have 
recommended in order for research organizations to improve their technology transition, 
and what ARDEC and the PEO has documented for the same transition. In this chapter we 
will compare and contrast the current state of the ARDEC Technology Transition Process 
(TTP) and actions being taken by ARDEC to improve its TTP. First, we will examine how 
ARDEC’s processes map to the recommended attributes that the S&T Affordability 
Workshop identified for successful technology transition. Then we will discuss what 
ARDEC has done to address these, including organizational structure, efforts in road-
mapping, alignment with customers, and TTAs. Through this analysis, we will show how 
ARDEC’s organizational structure, communication methods and processes are being 
matured to facilitate effective transition of technologies. We will also detail ARDEC’s 
Science & Technology (S&T) commitment to having a portfolio that focuses on the 
transition of technologies from S&T to Programs of Record. 
B. ALIGNMENT OF ARDEC S&T PROCESS TO HARGER AND 
KUBRICKY’S 2007 S&T AFFORDABILITY WORKSHOP, TRANSITION 
PANEL, JUNE 10–11, 1997  
1. Similarities 
A comparison of Harger and Kubricky’s (2007) Excerpt of S&T Affordability 
Workshop, Transition Panel (Table 1) to Pelino’s (n.d.) ODoT S&T Investment Strategy 
Process (Figure 7) demonstrates that ARDEC has incorporated into its S&T Process many 
elements that were recommended by the S&T Affordability Workshop. Some of those 
aspects were: 
 Frequent communication with the warfighter is achieved through the input 
from the various TRADOC Centers of Excellence, as is depicted in the 
beginning of the ARDEC process in Figure 7. Additionally, ARDEC seeks 
endorsement for its S&T proposals from the applicable Center(s) of 
Excellence prior to scoring them in order to obtain customer prioritization. 
The TRADOC Centers of Excellence are also voting members and 
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participants in the annual Portfolio Reviews, helping to get that much 
needed feedback throughout the development cycle. 
 Frequent Communication with the acquisition customer is achieved much 
in the same way as with the TRADOC Centers of Excellence. Using the PM 
Roadmaps as an input, ARDEC’s S&T process similarly seeks 
endorsements from its PM and PEO during the proposal submission 
process. The PEO and PM customers are also voting members and 
participants in the annual Portfolio Reviews. The PM customers also are 
engaged to develop the funding strategies for the eventual transition of the 
technology from ARDEC to the PM customer. However, planning at this 
stage can always have changes due to budgetary constraints that impact 
transition. 
 Early definition of requirements is apparent in the first major process step 
in Figure 8, the mapping of requirements to technology capabilities. 
 Formal roadmaps are represented three times in that first major step in the 
process as well: having PM roadmaps, ARDEC competency roadmaps and 
RDECOM technology roadmaps all as inputs to the requirements mapping 
to capabilities. 
 Honest peer review of the S&T Portfolio is conducted during the ARDEC 
Portfolio Review, where the review membership is made up of a significant 
number of voting members outside of ARDEC. This includes TRADOC 
requirements developers, acquisition customers, other government research 
and development agencies, and Joint Service representatives. 
 Integrated Product Team, inter-disciplinary team, and associated Transition 
Team are identified early in the process and through the proposal review 
process; all competencies are part of the development of the S&T projects 
as they are formed. 
 Inherent to the operations of ARDEC Headquarters and RDECOM 
Headquarters are that S&T Managers are selected in part due to their ability 
to be a marketeer. 
 Process capability is taken into consideration of the design of the S&T 
projects, and realism is inserted into the review process by having not only 
managerial voices in the decision-making process, but also the technical 
experts (usually the Army Senior Technologists – Senior Executive Service 
equivalents in specific technology areas). 
 Metrics for S&T Transition have been defined at the RDECOM level and 
are reported through the TCI. However, there are issues with these metrics  
that are discussed in the next paragraph. 
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 Risk management is part of every S&T project and reported at the normal 
project reviews, both at the RDECOM level and the ARDEC level (Harger 
& Kubricky, 2007, p. 4; Pelino, n.d., p. 2). 
2. Differences 
 As demonstrated by Pelino’s (n.d.) in ODoT S&T Investment Strategy 
Process (Figure 7)  ARDEC developed a process that encompassed many of the elements 
from Harger and Kubricky’s (2007) Excerpt of S&T Affordability Workshop, Transition 
Panel (Table 1), however, there were still areas for improvement. 
 While metrics for transition have been identified by RDECOM and are 
reported through the TCI, the meaningfulness and value of the metrics 
reported has not led to an increase in transition over the past decade. 
ARDEC is working, through the Portfolio Review Process and Strategic 
Planning Process, to better define, refine and track metrics that will be more 
useful for the organization. 
 While “probability of transition” is one of the metrics used in the Portfolio 
Review, the goal for this metric changes each year, and has done so for the  
past four yearly reviews. Probability of transition has been a focus of the 
Portfolio Review planning, execution and after-action processes. However, 
currently probability of transition only measures if the project has an 
endorsement from the appropriate TRADOC CoE , an endorsement from 
the appropriate PM, and a TTA from the appropriate PM. There are no other 
metrics to quantify or qualify  distinguish between projects in that area of 
“probability of transition.” 
 The ARDEC Director of Technology requests to have all S&T projects 
report their status in order to estimate the projected costs associated with 
the technologies and systems that each S&T project seeks to develop. 
However, the project leads often have little to no information to report back, 
this is especially true during the early applied research phase. This lack of 
information is mostly due to the uncertainty inherent to the immature 
technology and lack of a current manufacturer.   
 Industry routinely conducts Independent Research and Development 
(IRAD) reviews with government agencies. However, the establishment of 
timeliness and communication with industry partners is usually conducted 
at the technology competency manager level and therefore is not centralized 
and well collaborated across the entirety of the ARDEC Enterprise.   
 According to Dam & Willis (2011) “‘-ilities’ refer to the developmental, 
operational, and support requirements a program must address (e.g., 
availability, maintainability, vulnerability, reliability, supportability, etc.)” 
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(p. 5). Inclusion of the “-ilities” in each S&T project is a focus area of 
ARDEC S&T project reviews. However, other than to report that these 
considerations are part of the IPT discussions and membership, no other real 
data is gathered by this metric.  (Harger & Kubricky, 2007, p. 4; Pelino, 
n.d., p. 2). 
As illustrated above, ARDEC’s S&T Process, depicted in Figure 7, has 
incorporated many of the elements that were recommended as “What’s Good” by the S&T 
Affordability Workshop. However, there were still areas that were either being developed 
further or that could not be addressed fully. 
C. OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF TECHNOLOGY (ODoT) 
1. Establishment of ODoT 
In 2011, ARDEC created the Office of the Director of Technology (ODoT) which 
provided dedicated personnel to the planning and execution oversight of S&T. The ODoT 
replaced the legacy ad-hoc system of coordinating all of these efforts with only two 
dedicated personnel.  This resulted not only in the formulation of a group that was 
empowered to plan and manage the S&T budget for ARDEC, but also allowed the group 
to establish formal processes, procedures, plans and guidance for how they executed their 
mission and how they communicated that to the workforce effectively. As such, the 
ARDEC Director of Technology asked all relevant Stakeholders in ARDEC’s S&T 
community to provide senior-level representatives who would act as Subject-Matter-
Experts (SMEs) from their organizations and be empowered to provide the viewpoint of 
that organization in decisions on planning or changes to current projects. These SMEs 
helped ARDEC with internal collaboration amongst the different technical competencies 
routinely communicate both in-person and electronically in order to align and focus 
technology development efforts. 
The Director of Technology is responsible for the ARDEC S&T Portfolio.  
The Office of the Director of Technology (ODoT) supports the Director of 
Technology in the execution of the ARDEC S&T mission. The Director of 
Technology is responsible for the ARDEC S&T Portfolio. ODoT supports 
the Director of Technology in Developing and overseeing the Army 
Armament S&T Investment Strategy by building the ARDEC S&T 
Investment Portfolio; Aids in the development of solutions to current and 
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projected Army armament needs; Performs initial coordination of the 
ARDEC Subject Matter Experts and higher headquarters for concept 
development and subsequent transition management of these projects to the 
Command Centers and/or PMs; Partners with the Technology community 
to determine status and provide future assessments and analysis of 
armament technology and systems concepts  (“Office of the Director of 
Technology”, 2013). 
D. INVESTING IN TECHNOLOGY MATURITY 
Better Alignment with Stakeholders: Despite the noted transition barriers, the 
ARDEC Director of Technology had the mission to “coordinate, foster and manage 
technology transfer and transition with PEO, PM and TRADOC customers ensuring 
alignment of the S&T Portfolio with customer priorities. Streamline the fielding of new 
and innovative technologies to the Warfighter through understanding of the acquisition 
process and life cycle” (Mission and Major Functions of the U.S., Army Armament 
Research Development and Engineering Center, 2014, p. 31).  This is evident by the many 
customer engagements and endorsements throughout the S&T Process, which are depicted 
in Figure 8 – Aligned to Better Buying Power 3.0. This included both the TRADOC and 
PEO command structures. The former created the requirements that could become a PoR, 
and the latter actually managed the PoR. The ODoT helped to provide the necessary 
manpower to adequately plan and execute communication and formal reviews, by mapping 
ARDEC technological capabilities to associated identified capability gaps. This process 
led to a better understanding by the TRADOC community of these capabilities. This 
allowed the community to develop Joint Capabilities Integration Development System 
(JCIDS) requirements that were better informed and more representative of the realm of 
the possible. As stated in GAO’s Defense Management Guidance and Progress Measures 
are Needed to Realize Benefits from Changes in DOD’s Joint Requirements Process, a 
formal JCIDS requirements document took to 17 months or more to approve (GAO, 2012, 
p. 27).  As a result, this new process has not yet yielded any new approved requirements. 
New documents were drafted in multiple areas of ARDEC, which indicated more 
confidence in the future. 
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E. TECHNOLOGY TRANSITION AGREEMENT (TTA) 
Technology Transition Agreement Template: technology transition agreements 
were always a part of the S&T planning process through DAU and RDECOM regulatory 
requirements. However, the level of confidence in the TTA Process was low because of 
the poor technology transition rates. ARDEC and PEO Ammo noticed that a lack of 
consistency in the signature authorities, content, and follow-on coordination of these TTAs 
were the main causes for this transition level. For these reasons the new TTA template, 
depicted in Appendix A was developed and approved in December 2012 for use between 
ARDEC and PEO Ammo (ARDEC’s main customer). 
The TTA in Appendix A illustrates that the signature authority was finally 
consistent with the process, and concurrence was needed from senior leadership across 
PEO and ARDEC. This ensured that all the relevant Stakeholders were involved in the 
process. Each stakeholder was held responsible for both developing the technology and 
associated deliverables stated within the TTA; it also ensured that the PM customer agreed 
to transition those technologies to the respective PoRs. Additionally, the TTA specified 
more detail about the hardware, software, technical data and other products that were to be 
delivered, as well as the schedule and milestones needed for successful technology 
transition. Five TTAs were approved since the TTA template was implemented. Two of 
those technologies were transitioned to the PM customer. Regular communication fostered 
by the PM and ARDEC has resulted in solid transition plans with defined transition criteria 
for the remaining three that have yet to complete their S&T development. 
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IV. PROGRAM MANAGER EXPECTATIONS ANALYSIS 
A. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
This chapter focuses on comparing the expectations of the program manager and 
its role in technology transition to the actual practices and deliverables explored through 
the previous sections. This chapter will address the responsibility for getting technology 
inserted into a PoR, statutory obstacles that the PM may face, goals to be met from the 
PM’s perspective, and the importance of the research performed by the S&T community 
that informs these PoRs. Through the analysis of these areas, we can compare and contrast 
both the similarities and differences between the ARDEC processes and deliverables (and 
therefore, similar research and development organizations) and the expectations of PEO 
Ammo (and other Program Executive Offices and Program Managers).    
B. RESPONSIBILITY 
1. Program Manager 
On July 25, 2012, the Program Executive Office of Ammunition (PEO AMMO) 
established policy and requirements that assigned responsibilities, and prescribed 
procedures for preparing, processing and approving requests of external S&T activities. 
This was implemented for the following purposes: align efforts across the PEO and 
eliminate redundancies; prioritize efforts across the PEO; and ensure senior leader 
concurrence with future commitments to expend resources. Effective as of the 
aforementioned date, all endorsements that require current or future commitments by PEO 
AMMO, or one of its subordinate organizations requires approval and signature by a 
General Officer or Senior Executive. The PEO AMMO Chief of Staff or Chief Scientist 
can sign any endorsements that do not require a commitment of resources by the PEO. 
However, in all cases, all endorsements are required to be issued via PEO versus one of its 
subordinate PM/PD/PdM organizations (Madux, 2012, pp. 1–2). Therefore, because of this 
policy, the PM must adhere to certain rules and responsibilities in order to successfully 
endorse any new S&T technology transition.  
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The Program Manager directs “the development, production … initial deployment 
(at a minimum)”, and sustainment of new systems (Brown, 2010, p. 14). New systems are 
to be created within certain “cost, schedule, and performance constraints, as approved by 
the PM’s acquisition executive” (p. 14). “The PM’s role is to ensure the warfighter’s 
capability needs are met efficiently and effectively in the shortest possible time” (p. 14). 
The Program Manager’s job performance is measured by how they meet cost and schedule 
targets, and mitigate performance risk. All of this affects the way a PM supports technology 
transition. 
The role of the PM, regarding technology transition, was found to be vitally 
important. As with all things the PM executes, prior to considering a technology for 
transition, a PM should consider cost, schedule, performance, and the risks associated with 
those three areas. 
All of the statutory constraints placed on a P M have made it difficult for the PM to 
both perform its job duty and to consider “immature” and “unproven” technologies for 
transition. The PM’s risk-reward analysis has been biased toward minimizing cost and 
schedule risk, the areas most likely to be affected by inserting immature technologies. 
2. Science & Technology Managers 
S&T Managers have been  responsible for developing and transitioning 
technologies that can be used as direct products to be matured, fielded, and supported by 
the PM based upon its PoRs. S&T Managers also have also been responsible for supporting 
those programs once the technology is transitioned throughout the entire life cycle. 
As S&T Managers prepare their technologies for possible transition, they should 
assure alignment with their PM customers and provide deliverables (products or data) that 
will meet the expectations and needs in terms of cost, schedule, performance and the risks 
associated with those three factors. 
Both the PM and the S&T manager have one thing in common – resource 
constraints and the resulting need for prioritization. 
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3. Risk Reward 
“The risk–reward relationship for failure or success in military systems was noted 
as a primary barrier to the insertion of new technologies into military systems” (Committee 
on Accelerating Technology Transition, 2004, p. 4). “The risk–reward structures for 
military systems are shown schematically for noncritical and critical technologies in” 
Figure 5 of the Literature Review chapter (p. 24). The Committee on Accelerating 
Technology Transition report further states; that DOD breeds a culture that is averse to the 
risks associated with transitioning new technology at a rapid pace because the penalties for 
the failure of a critical technology program are incalculable. This is also evident by the 
perception that the rewards for success are considered exponentially smaller to the 
penalties for failure (p. 24).  This mentality is especially difficult to comprehend given the 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents our conclusions and recommendations. We will discuss the 
answers to our research questions, reiterated below. We will also discuss our 
recommendations to the S&T community. 
1. Primary Question 
What are the strengths and weaknesses of the overall process whereby the ARDEC 
Headquarters transitions S&T into Acquisition Programs of Record? 
2. Secondary Questions 
 How can the communication structure and process between ARDEC and 
the S&T community be described, i.e., extent of effectiveness of inter-
organizational communications and external stakeholder management. 
 What is the relationship structure between ARDEC and relevant Program 
Managers (PM); and ARDEC and PEO Ammo concerning the transition of 
S&T technology into ARDEC, and how is that relationship changing?  
B. ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS 
1. Secondary Questions 
 How can the communication structure and process between ARDEC and 
the S&T community be described, i.e., extent of effectiveness of inter-
organizational communications and external stakeholder management?   
As described within the Literature Review and the ARDEC Analysis sections, the 
ARDEC Director of Technology has identified the need to communicate routinely with 
Stakeholders across the DOD. The ARDEC process map includes up-front customer 
requirements discussions, takes input on priorities from the PEOs and TRADOC and aligns 
the portfolio of projects to the appropriate requirements. This ongoing communication  
aligns well with the findings depicted in Table 1, Excerpt of S&T Affordability 
Workshop’s Transition Panel, and the GAO reports previously discussed which state that 
a best practice is the “early definition of requirements”.  
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In addition,  communication is further achieved through documentation such as the 
TTA Template contained in Appendix A. This document assures that all relevant 
stakeholders have a vested investment in the technology to be developed and the process 
in which it will transition into the PM  . The TTA maps to specific practices identified by 
the previously identified GAO reports and Table 2, Excerpt of S&T Affordability 
Workshop’s Transition Panel, which contains “establish transition team from the 
beginning,” “mitigate / define risk” and “establish S&T metrics on transition”. 
Furthermore, ARDEC has aligned its S&T process, as illustrated in Figure 7 – S&T 
Investment Strategy Process, to DOD initiatives such as the  Better Buying Power 3.0 
(depicted in Figure 8) and the development of formal roadmaps as demonstrated in the 
S&T Affordability Workshop’s Transition Panel in Table 1. 
Additionally, ARDEC utilizes “honest peer reviews” in its Portfolio Reviews. This 
is another “What’s Good” S&T Affordability (Table 1) practice which  is performed 
annually by ARDEC to provide and formulate objective feedback on the projects in the 
portfolio by ARDEC and its stakeholders. 
The previous paragraphs in this section demonstrate many of the ways that ARDEC 
has worked with its customers in order to align and improve the probability of transition. 
However, “including industry” and “conduct affordability / cost analysis” are two  elements 
identified in Table 3, Excerpt of S&T Affordability Workshop’s Transition Panel, that are 
not depicted in the ARDEC processes. 
The absence of Industry Partners in the ARDEC S&T process illustrated in Figure 
7 and the TTA Template contained in Appendix A could be an area in which ARDEC can 
improve its transition, based upon the findings of the S&T Affordability Workshop’s 
Transition Panel (Table 1).  Additionally, including affordability metrics as part of the TTA 
Template may help to highlight the importance of affordability information to the success 
of the transition. The affordability metric may be applicable to be included in the section 
that currently discussed the funding strategy section of the TTA. This information should 
help to strengthen the probability of transition based upon the findings of the S&T 
Affordability Workshop’s Transition Panel (Table 1). 
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 What is the relationship structure between ARDEC and relevant Program 
Managers (PM); and ARDEC and Program Executive Officer Ammunition 
(PEO Ammo) concerning the transition of S&T technology into ARDEC, 
and how is that relationship changing?   
As described in the ARDEC and PEO Ammo analysis contained within the 
Literature Review  sections, the existing relationship between ARDEC S&T and PEO 
Ammo, specifically related to transition has become more focused during the past several 
years. This increased collaboration has resulted in quarterly reviews at the PEO-level and 
annual detailed project reviews at the PM-level. These reviews help to assure the alignment 
with the most up-to-date customer priorities, as well as help to provide a forum for any 
issues to be discussed and resolved.   
For example, in a recent meeting between ARDEC S&T and Project Manager – 
Towed Artillery Systems (TAS), (one of the PMs under PEO Ammo) the two groups had 
to discuss and agree upon a path forward for the TTA involving  the Future Artillery Survey 
System, targeted for an FY17 transition to PM-TAS and PEO Ammo. Discussions continue 
at the time this paper was written, with the goal of an approved TTA in the near future.  
The TTA Template in Appendix A documents the formal relationship between 
ARDEC and PEO Ammo for S&T technology transition to programs of record.  The 
inclusion of the PEO in the formal ARDEC S&T Process depicted in Figure 7 further shows 
the strength of this relationship. Constant contact between both organizations is paramount 
to the success of technology transition and aligns well with the S&T Affordability 
Workshop’s Transition Panel best practices in Table 1 and the GAO findings presented in 
the Literature Review.  The evolution of this relationship is becoming more closely tied, 
as evidenced in the increased formal documentation, such as the TTA Template, and the 
process of including routine reviews and changes to the process. 
2. Primary Question:  
What are the strengths and weaknesses of the overall process whereby the ARDEC 
Headquarters transitions S&T into Acquisition Programs of Record? 
  As discussed in the ARDEC Analysis section that detailed the alignment with the 
S&T Affordability Workshop’s recommended attributes of successful technology 
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transition, ARDEC has worked closely with the Stakeholders in the S&T community to 
develop and improve their S&T Investment Process. There are still areas for improvement, 
but ARDEC seems aware of these areas and is working to address them, most prominently 
with its resident customer at Picatinny, PEO Ammo.  This endeavor for improvement can 
be seen through all of the reasons described in the responses to the secondary questions 
such as the TTA Template and alignment to Better Buying Power 3.0. 
To summarize the findings described in the responses to the secondary questions, 
the strengths ARDEC exemplifies as described by the “What’s Good” list from the S&T 
Affordability Workshop’s Transition Panel in Table 1 include; 
 Early Definition of Requirements 
 Establish Transition Team from the Beginning 
 Mitigate / Define Risk 
 Establish S&T Metrics on Transition 
 Develop Formal Roadmaps 
 Honest Peer Review 
Using the same list from Table 1, the two gaps ARDEC has in its current process 
and documentation are: 
 Including Industry 
 Conduct Affordability / Cost Analysis 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The below are recommendations for other Research and Development 
Organizations seeking to implement an S&T Process using ARDEC as a benchmark  that 
uses these Best Practices as described in the ARDEC Section. These are tied back to the 
findings from the GAO and the S&T Affordability Workshop’s Transition Panel: 
First, endorsement from current and future customers is critical to the identification 
that there is an interest in technology  should be inserted. This endorsement should include 
the type of technology, the specific transition time frame, and how it will fit within the 
overall program framework. Many PEOs and PMOs have begun developing roadmaps for 
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their specific commodities to plan technology insertion points, quantify the number of 
spare parts for the lifetime of a system, and to identify a system’s useful life requirements 
before it is planned to be replaced with an upgraded or new system/solution. 
Second, to assist  in the development of requirements up-front and early 
collaboration with the Soldier community and the respective CoE is essential. Without 
requirements, completed S&T projects have few avenues for proceeding as PoRs. Aside 
from participating in demonstrations to gain interest from SOCOM, Rapid Equipment 
Force (REF) or another organization with the ability to purchase systems independent of 
the normal Acquisition Life Cycle Process, there needs to be a requirement in order for 
S&T efforts to become PoRs. Collaboration will help  make the CoE aware of the 
capabilities of S&T and make the CoE aware of the current technologies that are available 
or already being developed. 
Third, alignment with currently identified Soldier needs and existing/staffed 
requirements documents is needed. Similar to the previous collaboration, this is a document 
review and match between existing identified gap areas from the Soldier community, such 
as War Fighter Outcomes (WFOs) and the prioritized gap areas from each CoE. Analyzing 
the WFOs and current requirements documents and then aligning   S&T Portfolio with  
these documents can be very helpful in transitioning to a PoR. Having requirement 
documents already completed is a huge advantage in this matter. However, even without a 
requirements document it is important to at least be aligned with existing documentation 
of gap areas in order to justify the work that you do, while you can work with the CoE in 
order to develop a requirements document for transition when the effort is complete. 
Fourth, up-front and early collaboration and communication between developing 
organizations is essential. Most projects require inter-operability and different 
development agencies to work in harmony in order to accomplish the successful, timely, 
and technical completion of a project. For example, the identified weapons experts must 
work with the platform experts and the communications experts. Without this 
collaboration, integration, functionality and logistics support technology transition would  
at a very high risk and could easily lead to the transition failing or being delayed. Working 
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together and defining interfaces and controls for those interfaces is paramount to having 
the systems work together like they need to in today’s System-of-Systems reality of the 
battlefield. 
Fifth, having the ability to successfully leverage capabilities available to provide 
the best possible solution to the War Fighter is imperative. This includes being aware of 
and collaborating with academia, industry and foreign agencies. There are many ways to 
perform this collaboration; through attendance at conferences, Industry Research And 
Development reviews, Technical Information Exchanges, Foreign Technology 
Information Papers, and even Internet searches. All of these help us to leverage as much 
technological knowledge as possible when developing the solutions to War Fighter needs 
that can be transitioned to PoRs and ultimately the Soldiers themselves. 
Finally, TTAs need to be in place and have explicit criteria for both the developing 
agency and the future customers. The two major issues with this currently is that the 
deliverables of the S&T efforts are not clearly defined and that the future customers make 
no commitments to use the developed technologies. This is why having a defined 
requirement is so important. Without a requirements document of some kind, it is difficult 
for a customer to transition the technology to a PoR. Additionally, regular status reviews 
between the PM and ARDEC are very important in assuring continued commitment, 
alignment and execution of the technology for transition. 
The below are recommendations that ARDEC should continue to pursue or should 
incorporate into their S&T Process to improve the transition of technology to PEO and PM 
customers: 
1. Focus on the transition and identify and track meaningful metrics 
associated with technology transition. The kind of metrics are situational 
dependent; however, the metrics should be agreed to up-front by all 
stakeholders and reviewed regularly. 
2. Include industry in a systematic and routine way as part of the process, so 
that it is beneficial to both the industry and government sectors. 
3. Address all “-ilities” in a meaningful way,  rather than merely assuring 
membership on the S&T project IPTs. This means being able to identify 
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design and functionality changes and decisions that were influenced by 
these design considerations. 
4. Conduct affordability and cost tradeoffs by updating the cost data as the 
technology matures and as relevant manufacturing and support costs 
become more evident. 
5. Fill all key project management positions with qualified people. 
Individuals with  technology transition experience would be the best 
choice. 
6. Assure that program managers and transition managers  remain assigned 
for the duration of the associated project(s). 
7. Favor operational development over formal demonstrations. 
8. Use service acquisition organizations to periodically evaluate and advise 
the project team. 
9. Adapt the R&D project deliverables or tradeoffs in cost, schedule, 
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